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The Distinct Impact of Food Stamps  on
Food  Spending
Parke Wilde  and Christine Ranney
The Southworth  hypothesis predicts  that inframarginal  food stamp  recipients should
choose  the  same bundle  of goods,  whether they  receive coupons  or cash.  Empirical
research  has  contradicted  this prediction.  Here, we present a model that retains some
attractive  features  of the  Southworth  hypothesis,  while relaxing  the key assumption
that appears  to be incorrect.  In particular,  we allow different forms  of benefits  to have
distinct  effects  on desired, or unrestricted,  food spending.  Two categories  of previously
commonly  used empirical  models  are  evaluated  as  special  cases of our  more  general
model.  We  estimate this  model using data from two cash-out experiments.
Key  words:  food  consumption,  food  stamps,  nonlinear  regression,  program  evalu-
ation
Introduction
Economists  have remained  uncertain  of how  much more effective  are food stamps  than
cash benefits  at increasing  food expenditures.  This uncertainty  persists because the most
commonly used theoretical  model,  the Southworth  hypothesis,  has been  contradicted by
a  large  body  of empirical  evidence.  Ironically,  applied  models  can  be  misspecified  if
they  assume  that the  Southworth hypothesis  is correct,  and they  can  be equally  suspect
if they ignore  this hypothesis  altogether.
The Southworth hypothesis  centers  on the  distinction between  two categories  of food
stamp  coupon  recipients:  (a)  unconstrained  or inframarginal  recipients,  whose food  ex-
penditures exceed  the value of their coupon benefits,  and (b) constrained or extramarginal
recipients,  whose  food expenditures  are less than  or equal  to  the value  of their coupon
benefits.  The hypothesis  maintains that  inframarginal  recipients should choose  the same
bundle of goods  whether  they receive food  stamps  or cash.
Twenty years  of empirical  research  have  contradicted  this  prediction.  In light  of this
research,  it makes  sense to propose a model that distinguishes  between inframarginal  and
extramarginal  food  stamp  recipients,  in  a  manner  consistent  with  theory  but  without
assuming  that inframarginal  recipients  are unaffected  by the form of their benefits.
We present  and  test  such  a  model using  data  from food  stamp  cash-out experiments
in  San  Diego  and  Alabama.  An  appealing  feature  of this model  is  that  two  important
categories  of models  used previously  can  be  treated  as  special  cases:  one  assumes  the
Southworth  hypothesis  is  correct,  and  the  other  ignores  the  distinction  between  infra-
marginal  and extramarginal  recipients.
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Y  = Ordinary income  Yco  = Dollar value of coupon  benefits
Figure 1.  Choice  under the Southworth hypothesis.
Note:  The  axes  are scaled  so that  a unit  of food  or a unit of other goods  each  costs one  dollar.
Theory and Literature Review
If food stamp coupons can only be used to purchase food, then a recipient family's budget
constraint  is  piecewise  linear or  "kinked,"  when  drawn  in  two  dimensions  (fig.  1).  If
utility is increasing  in both  arguments, then  constrained  families may consume less food
if the Food Stamp  Program is cashed out, but unconstrained  families  will be unaffected.
Likewise,  constrained  families  may  prefer cash  to  coupons,  but  unconstrained  families
will be  indifferent  (Southworth;  Mittelhammer  and West).
These predictions  are routinely assumed to  be true in  the current theoretical  literature
on cash  and in-kind  government  benefits,  even in  articles that  argue in  favor of in-kind
transfers  (Gahvari).  In current  empirical  work,  these  hypotheses  also are  frequently  as-
sumed to be true  (see Murray,  for example,  and the censored-dependent-variable  models
in  Moffitt).
Despite  the logic  and popularity  of these hypotheses,  empirical  research has  not sup-
ported them. The studies reported in table 1 are representative  of a large body of research
that estimated  Engel functions for food stamp  and income  variables. Especially  after the
elimination  of the  purchase  requirement  for food  stamps  in  1979,  it became  clear  that
most  recipients  were  unconstrained,  so  the  observed  differences  were  considered  sur-
prising.
To test the Southworth hypothesis more formally,  Senauer and Young estimated a tobit
model  that  distinguished  between  constrained  and  unconstrained  families.  They  found
that  the proportion  of total income  received  as  food stamps  affected  food expenditure,
even when the benefits  were in theory unrestricted.  Thus, the authors  rejected the South-
worth model as  "incomplete."  Our model below  can be seen  as  a way of extending  and
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Table  1.  Estimated Marginal Propensity to  Consume




Study  Stamps  Income
West  and  Price  0.30  0.05
Chavas and  Yeung  0.37  0.13
Smallwood and  Blaylock  0.23  0.10
Senauer and  Young
1978  Michigan  PSID  data  0.33  0.05
1979  Michigan  PSID  data  0.26  0.07
Moffitt
Linear  form  0.16  0.13
Logarithmic  form  0.11  0.12
Levedahl
Linear form  0.48  0.08
Semi-log form  0.50  0.10
Double-log form  0.29  0.09
Translog form  0.69  0.19
Sources:  Condensed  from Fraker; Moffitt;  Levedahl.
correcting  the  Southworth-based  model  rejected  by  Senauer  and  Young,  in  a  manner
consistent with  their discussion.
In the early  1990s, the U.S. Department  of Agriculture  (USDA)  authorized four cash-
out demonstrations,  in part to  settle this controversy.  Two of these studies, in  San Diego
County  and parts  of Alabama,  were  "pure"  cash-out  experiments:  recipients  were  ran-
domly  assigned  to receive  either food  stamp coupons  or cashable checks  for the equiv-
alent value,  and no other changes  were  made  in program operation.
In spite  of this  scientific  design,  the results  were  difficult to interpret  (table  2). In the
San Diego  study,  the check  cohort  spent  on average  6.78%  less than the coupon  cohort
on food at home per week per equivalent  nutrition unit (ENU,  a measure of family size
in adult male equivalent units adjusted for age, sex, and number of guests at meals) (Ohls
et  al.).'  In  Alabama,  the  difference  in  food  spending per  ENU between  the check  and
coupon  cohorts  was  near  zero  and  not  statistically  significant.  When  measured  at  the
household  level,  the  check  cohort even  appeared  to  have  slightly higher  food spending
than the coupon cohort;  although, again,  this difference  was  not significant (Fraker et al.
1992).
In the Alabama sample 26%  of all coupon recipients  could be classified as constrained;
while  in  San  Diego  only  5%  of coupon  recipients  could  be  classified  as  constrained.
Thus, counterintuitively,  there was a significant cash-out effect in San Diego with a small
number  of constrained  families  and  no  significant  cash-out  effect  in  Alabama  with  a
large number  of constrained  families.
Technically,  the survey instrument  measured the money  value of purchased food used at home  in a given week. Through-
out, we  use  "food  spending"  as shorthand  for this variable.
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Table 2.  Impact of Food  Stamp Cash-out on  Food Spending,  San
Diego  and Alabama
Check  Coupon  Difference  (%)  t-Statistic
Weekly  food  spending
per ENU:
San Diego  $33.28  $35.70  -6.78  2.45
Alabama  $33.43  $33.66  -0.68  0.31
Monthly program  benefits
per FCU:
San Diego  $116.20  $116.46  -0.22  0.07
Alabama  $169.27  $168.80  0.28  0.09
Sample  size:
San Diego  542  536
Alabama  1209  1080
Notes: ENU is equivalent nutrition unit, a measure of household  size, adjusted for
age and  sex  of household  members  and  for  the  number  of  guest meals.  FCU  is
food consumption  unit.
Sources:  Fraker  et al.  1992,  1993;  and  Ohls  et al.
The  authors of the original report on the Alabama pure cash-out demonstration offered
several plausible explanations  for the surprisingly  small cash-out  effect in that  study.  In
short, they attributed the lack of cash-out effect in Alabama  to peculiarities in the research
design and  sample population  (Fraker et al.  1992).  The authors  of the San Diego report
mentioned  that  their modest  cash-out effect  appeared  consistent with  the  small number
of constrained  families,  as  would  be  predicted  by  the  Southworth  hypothesis  (Ohls  et
al.).  Neither  report described  its results  as inconsistent  with the Southworth  hypothesis,
as  we  find below.
Procedure
This  section  begins  with  our  full  nonlinear  maximum-likelihood  model  for  estimating
Engel  functions for food expenditure,  while taking explicit account of the kinked budget
constraint generated by targeted food stamp benefits. The full model accepts Southworth's
account  of the behavior of constrained  recipients but relaxes  the assumption that uncon-
strained recipients  necessarily  treat food stamps  and checks  alike. This  section then dis-
cusses  two  models  that  can  be  considered  special  cases  of the  full  model.  Finally,  it
describes  specifications  tests and  data collection.
The full model postulates that for each family i, desired (or unrestricted)  food spending
(Fi*) is a function of effective full income  (FY,),  a vector of economic  and demographic
factors  (X,),  and  an element of random  variation  (e,)  due  to heterogeneity  of food pref-
erences  that is not captured  by the  independent variables:
(1)  Fi*  =  G(FYi,  Xi)  +  ei.
If the Southworth hypothesis  is true, then FYi is simply the sum of food stamp benefits
and  other  income.  In the  more  general  case,  where  these  different  resources  can have
different effects  on unrestricted  food spending,  we assume  the following:
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(2)  FYi =  Yi  +  ylYch,  +  y2Ycoi.
In this  equation,  y,  (the  "check  factor")  represents  the number  of dollars  of ordinary
income  (Yi)  needed  to  have  the  same  effect  on  food  spending  as  one  dollar  of check
benefits  (Ychi).  Likewise,  72  (the  "coupon  factor")  represents  the  number  of dollars  of
ordinary income needed to have the same effect on food spending as one dollar of coupon
benefits  (Ycoi).
Due to the fragility of food demand estimates with different functional forms, reported
by Levedahl,  four forms  for desired food expenditure  were used,  namely:
(3a)  Linear  G(FYi, Xi)  =  ao  +  acFYi + f3'Xi,
(3b)  Semi-log  G(FYi, Xi)  =  ao +  alog[FYi] + f3'X,,
(3c)  Double-log  log[G(FYi, Xi)]  = a0 +  a1log[FY]  +  3'X,,
and
(3d)  Share  G(FYi, X)  =  ao  + alog[FY i]  +  3'X,,
FY,
where  a0 and  ac  are  scalar  parameters,  and  38  is  a  k-dimensional  vector  of parameters
corresponding  to  k demographic  variables.  These  functional  forms  were  chosen for the
range  of Engel  relationships  they  are  capable  of modeling  and  for  their  frequent  ap-
pearance in  the literature.
The linear form imposes the assumption that the marginal propensity  to consume food
is  constant  across  income  levels.  The  semi-log  and  double-log  forms  display  concave
curvature with respect to income, potentially  describing  low-income consumers'  propen-
sity  to  spend  a  higher  share  of marginal  income  on  food.  The  share  form  has  been
discussed  by Working;  Leser;  and Deaton  and Muellbauer,  and it was  one  of the forms
estimated  in Moffitt's  study. Its merits  include  satisfying  some requirements  of the eco-
nomic  theory of consumer  choice ("adding-up")  and  permitting the  easy imposition  of
others ("homogeneity  and "ymmetry").  However, the presence of the income variable
on  both  sides  of equation  (3d)  may  increase  the  susceptibility  of the  share  functional
form  to measurement  error in that  variable  (Moffitt).
For unconstrained families  (identified by the dummy parameter value Di=0), observed
food  spending  (F,) equals  desired  food  spending.  For  constrained  families  (D,=1), ob-
served food  spending  equals the value  of food stamp  coupons  (Yco,).  Thus,
(4)  Fi =  DYco,  + (1  - D,)[G(FYi, Xi)  +  ej],
where
Di =  1  if Yco,  '  G(FY,,  Xi)  + ei,
Di = 0  otherwise.
In his article  on the Puerto Rico cash-out,  Moffitt appended a second error term to his
version  of  (4)  to  account  for measurement  error in  the  dependent  variable.  If there  is
measurement  error,  the  main  hazard  of the  "one-error"  model used  here  is that  some
observations  could be misclassified  as constrained  or unconstrained.  The one-error model
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was  considered  adequate  for  this  application  after  a  range  of cutoff  points  for distin-
guishing  constrained  and  unconstrained  families  was  found to  yield  similar results.
Several assumptions have been required for econometric  models of this type  (Senauer
and  Young;  Moffitt).  Food  is  taken  to  be  a  good,  so families  have  no  reason  to  leave
food stamp coupons  unspent (the cross-sectional  data did not permit considering possible
savings  behavior  or illegal resale  of food  stamps).  The error  term is  taken  to be  inde-
pendently  and identically  normally  distributed.
The  log-likelihood  function for our full model is therefore:
(5)  log[L(ao,  a,  ,  /3,  '  '  y2k,  ,e F, Y, Ych,  Yco,  X)]
=  Dilog  + (1-Di)log[---  +  (  -D)lg
where  (/  is  the standard  normal  cumulative  distribution  function,  and  b is the  standard
normal  density  function.  We maximized  this  log-likelihood  function with  respect to  all
parameters using  the Limdep statistical  package.
We also estimated  two models that can be considered  special  cases of our full model.
The first special  case is  a Southworth-consistent  specification,  which  assumes  that cou-
pons,  checks,  and  income  have  the  same  effect  on  desired  food  spending  (as  in  the
censored-dependent-variable  models  used  by Moffitt  and  by  Murray).  To  estimate  this
model,  we  restricted  the  "check  factor"  and  the  "coupon  factor"  to  equal  unity  and
maximized  the  resulting  log-likelihood  function.  This  restricted  model  is  equivalent  to
the tobit model that would be  appropriate  if the Southworth hypothesis were assumed to
be correct.
The second  special  case is  a model  that ignores  the  kinked  budget constraint  (as  did
the  models  used by  West  and  Price  and  by  Chavas  and  Yeung).  Ignoring  the  kinked
budget  constraint  is equivalent  to  assuming  Di equals  zero in  (4)  for all individuals,  so
observed  food  spending equals  desired  food  spending.  We  estimated  this  model  using
ordinary least  squares.
An  advantage  of using experimental  data in  this  study is that for the first time speci-
fication  tests for desired food spending  could be estimated using  the check cohort  alone,
greatly  simplifying  the  tests  (necessarily,  this  procedure  requires  omitting  the  coupon
variable).  We  used  the  check  cohort  to  test  for  heteroskedasticity,  which  can  lead  to
inconsistent estimates in nonlinear maximum-likelihood models. Also, using the full sam-
ple,  we checked  two  alternative  definitions  of the dummy  variable  (Di), to  confirm that
our results  were  not highly  sensitive  to  the cutoff point  used to  distinguish  constrained
and unconstrained  families.2
The  data  collection  is described  in  the  cash-out demonstration  reports  (Fraker  et al.
1992;  Ohls  et  al.).  In-person  interviews  were  conducted  with  1,143  recipients  in  San
Diego  and  2,386  recipients  in  Alabama,  with  a  response  rate  of 78%  at  each  location.
The food  expenditure  data were  calculated  from  detailed  questions  on  food  use during
the  seven  days  preceding  the  interview.  Only  "house-keeping"  households  (not home-
2 In  addition,  we  attempted  rigorous  tests of the  four functional  forms.  Box-Cox  transformations  can  be used to compare
the  first three forms,  but this method proved cumbersome  due to the multiple  parameters within  FY,.  Furthermore,  neither a
nonnested  J-test nor a test  using the Box-Cox  transformation  were powerful  enough to rule out either the linear or semi-log
form in favor of the other.  Formal tests  were not pursued for the remaining  forms.
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Table  3.  Mean Values for  Variables Used  to Estimate
Food  Demand,  San Diego  and Alabama
San
Variable  Diego  Alabama
Money  value  of food used at home
per AME  30.36  29.46
Food  stamp benefits  per AME ($)  12.17  18.19
Check benefits  per AME ($)
(0 for coupon recipients)  6.29  9.53
Coupon  benefits  per  AME ($)
(0 for check recipients)  5.88  8.66
Ordinary  income per AME  ($)  91.98  58.68
Full  income per AME  ($)  104.15  76.87
Family size  in AME  2.44  2.14
Other  income  in household  per AME ($)  20.61  4.38
Urban  residence  0.48
Person  sampled
Is Asian  0.12
Is Black  0.20  0.68
Is Hispanic  0.33  0.00
Didn't complete  8th grade  0.16  0.28
Completed high school  0.57  0.41
Is <30  years  old  0.44  0.24
Children present  in unit  0.94  0.60
Elderly  present in  unit  0.02  0.25
Female  head present in unit  0.85  0.87
Note:  AME  is  adult  male  equivalent,  a  measure  of household  size,
adjusted for age  and sex  of household members.
less) were  included. Mean values for the variables  are reported in table 3.  Approximately
half the recipients  in  each  sample received  coupons,  and  half received  checks.
Results
Qualitatively,  the results  from  the full  model  appear  similar  to the  pattern  observed  in
the  simple comparisons  of mean  food spending between  the  coupon  and  check cohorts
in  the  cash-out  experiments.  Table  4  shows  a  sizeable  difference  between  the  "check
factor"  and  "coupon factor"  in San Diego (where  few coupon  families  are constrained).
It shows  a  smaller  difference  between the  "check factor"  and  "coupon  factor"  in Ala-
bama  (where  over one-quarter  of coupon  families  are constrained).
For  conciseness,  table  4  contains  results  with  the  linear  and  semi-log  forms,  which
had the lowest estimated root mean squared residuals.3 Predicted values for this goodness-
of-fit measure were estimated with the full model (check cohort alone), and with the first
special-case  model  (both cohorts).  The  predicted  values  were  then  transformed  appro-
priately,  in  the  case  of the  double-log  and  share  forms,  before  the  root mean  squared
3  Results with  the double-log  and share  functional  forms  are available  from the authors.
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Table 4.  Piecewise  Linear Constraint (PLC) Models  of  Food Spending,  San Diego  and
Alabama
San Diego  Alabama









































































































































Notes:  Asymptotic  standard errors  are in parentheses.  One asterisk indicates  significantly different from
zero at 90% confidence level.  Two asterisks indicate  significantly  different from zero at 99%  confidence
level.
residuals  were  calculated.  In  both  San Diego  and  Alabama,  the two  models  ranked  the
functional forms in the same order, from best to worst: linear, semi-log, double-log,  share.
What  table  4 reveals,  which  the  comparisons  of mean  food spending  between  exper-
imental cohorts  do not, is that even in San Diego the observed cash-out effect  is not due
to the behavior of constrained recipients.  Rather, food stamp coupons, food stamp checks,
and  ordinary  income  have  distinct effects  on  desired  food spending,  as  well  as  on  ob-
served food spending.
Conveniently,  the first special  case  (the model with the  "check  factor"  and  "coupon
factor"  constrained  to equal unity)  can be viewed  simulteneously  as a test of the  statis-
tical  significance  of these  differences.  In  San Diego,  a likelihood  ratio test rejected  the
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restricted  model at the  95%  confidence  level with the double-log  functional  form and at
the  90%  confidence  level with  the  linear  and  semi-log  functional  forms.  These results
replicate  Senauer  and  Young's  rejection  of the  Southworth-consistent  specification  and
confirm  the need  for  a less restrictive  model.
In  Alabama,  the  restricted  model  was  rejected  at  the  99%  confidence  level  with  all
four functional forms, but this rejection  does not indicate the same type of cash-out effect
that  was  found in  San Diego.  The  restricted  model was  rejected primarily  because both
coupons  and  checks  had different  effects  from ordinary  income  (a phenomenon  that is
discussed below).  A more specific  test of the equality of the "check factor"  and  "coupon
factor"  alone  yielded  lower chi-squared  statistics  for the likelihood  ratio test,  although
surprisingly,  these  statistics  were  still  significant  at the  95%  confidence  level for all but
the  double-log  functional  form.
Taken at face value,  these latter tests would indicate that in Alabama the small positive
difference  in food spending between  the check  cohort  and the  coupon  cohort  is statisti-
cally significant,  unless the double-log  functional  form is the correct specification.  While
this pattern seems  implausible  at  first,  such  a pattern could  arise  if the  illegal resale  of
food stamps  were common  before the experiment began.  In that case,  one effect  of cash-
out would be to save  some check recipients  from the expense of paying  a  "penalty"  to
food stamp traffickers,  thereby increasing the net income these recipients  have for spend-
ing  on food and  other goods.
The second  special case (the model that ignores the kink) yielded estimated parameters
for the  "check  factor"  and  "coupon  factor"  in  both  experiments  that  generally  were
within  17%  of those found with the full model (table 5).  The qualitative  implications  of
the full model and this  second special  case were effectively identical:  the estimated cash-
out effect  was  sizeable in  San Diego but  small or nonexistent in Alabama.
For  the test  of heteroskedasticity,  we  used the  linear  functional  form  and  the  check
cohort  alone to  estimate  a  model where the  variance  of the  error term was presumed to
have the form ae 2FYi". In both  San Diego  and Alabama,  a Lagrange  multiplier test failed
to  reject  the  null  hypothesis  of  homoskedasticity  (y=0)  at the  0.05  significance  level.
While this test did reject the null at the 0.10 significance  level for the San Diego sample,
heteroskedasticity-corrected  estimates were almost exactly the same as the estimates from
OLS  (the difference  was  less than 3% for the income  and benefit  parameters).
To  confirm that  the  results  of the  full  model  were  not highly  variable  according  to
how  the kink  was  defined, we  also  used food spending  levels  of  1.1  times  Yco  and  1.5
times  Yco,  instead  of  Yco  itself,  as  cutoff points  for distinguishing  constrained  and un-
constrained  families.  These  definitions  can be  seen  as  a  way of accounting  for the pos-
sibility that families  may buy  some food with cash even before their food stamp coupons
are  used  up,  due  to  convenience  or  budgeting  difficulty.  Slope  parameters  from these
alternate  models differed  little from  the parameters  for the full model we report in table 4.
Discussion
Our results  confirm that the Southworth-consistent  model (the first special case)  is not a
reliable  basis  for empirical  specifications,  at least  within  the  range  of models  studied
here.  The key  assumption  that appears  to  be incorrect  is that  food stamp  coupons  have
the same effect as other income on desired food spending. By contrast, our results suggest
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Table 5.  Models  of Food  Spending Ignoring the "Kink," San Diego  and Alabama
San Diego  Alabama









































































































































Notes:  Asymptotic  standard errors  are in parentheses.  One  asterisk indicates  significantly different from
zero at 90% confidence level. Two  asterisks indicate significantly different from zero at 99%  confidence
level.
that a model ignoring  the kinked  budget constraint  (the second  special case)  would have
made little  difference  in key  parameter estimates,  at least for the data studied here.  This
conclusion  to  some  extent  corroborates  the  simple  empirical  models used  in the  1970s
and  early  1980s,  before  it  became  common  to  incorporate  the  Southworth  hypothesis
explicitly.  The best argument for preferring  our full model over these  simpler models is
that,  as  long  as  nonlinear regression  techniques  are  available,  it makes  sense to  let the
data decide whether the behavior of constrained recipients  is significant enough  to affect
the empirical  estimates.
In  supporting  our  full  model,  it is  also  necessary  to  consider  what decision-making
process might lead recipients  to behave  as the model describes.  One reason that Senauer
and  Young's  article  has not convinced  the theoretical  and empirical  literatures  to forego
Wilde, RanneyJournal of Agricultural and Resource Economics
relying  on  the  Southworth  propositions  is  that  these  propositions  are  a  straightforward
consequence  of rational  choice  subject  to the  traditional  kinked  budget constraint.  The
challenge  for alternatives  to  the  traditional  theory  is to  answer  the  following  question:
why do  coupon recipients  who can afford the bundle of goods  preferred by check recip-
ients choose  a different  bundle?
Two  approaches  to  answering  this  question  are raised  here, but  both  are  still under-
developed. First, game-theoretic  models have been used to address intrahousehold control
questions  (Montalto). If different types of benefits are systematically allocated to different
members  of the household, the distinct impact of coupons and checks  can be explained.
Though  anecdotal,  comments  from  focus  group  participants  can  illuminate these  in-
trahousehold  issues. According  to  one male  check recipient in Alabama:
It  [checks]  is a hassle in my family.  I don't really care.  My wife  is the one who  cares about it....
She's  afraid  I'm  gonna  end  up  in  some  local  beer  joint drunker  than  hell  from  now on....  We
spend more  in food than  what the  check  amounts  to anyway.  She'd rather have  food  stamps, you
know, than to  get the check  (Mazur and  Ciemnecki,  p.  15).
Second,  models  of  "quasi-rational"  choice  (Thaler and  Shefrin)  suggest  early  steps
toward dealing  with difficult issues of self-restraint  and wise decision making that  seem
to be on the minds of recipients  and policymakers alike,  but which have proven difficult
to  address  with  traditional  economic  models.  If food stamp  coupons  help recipients  to
organize  their monthly budget in  a fashion that favors  food spending,  the distinct effect
can again be explained. Corroborating an earlier conjecture  by Fraker that some recipients
might  actually  prefer coupons  to  checks  for budgeting  reasons,  sizeable  proportions  of
the  San Diego  sample  agreed  or strongly  agreed  with  statements  that  stamps  are better
than  checks  for budgeting  (52%)  or  stamps  give  more  control  over  food  expenditure
(64%).  As  a matter  of epistemology,  the people  being modeled  by an economic  theory
need not hold  opinions consistent  with that theory-they  need  only make  spending  de-
cisions  as if they do-but these  responses  still appear  inconsistent  with the  predictions
of the  Southworth  model.
Taken literally, models of intrahousehold behavior and models of quasi-rational choice
would  lead  to more  complex  specifications  than have  been  attempted  here.  Indeed,  for
each alternative  model the ideal  specification  would require data that are not commonly
available.  As  an  approximation,  our full-model  shares  some of the  essential  character-
istics  of these  alternative  models:  coupon  families  must  spend at least their food stamp
allotment  on  food,  but  even  if  the  family  overall  is  inframarginal,  family  members'
utility-maximizing  choices  may  still  differ from  those they would  have  made  had they
received checks.
Finally,  the  Alabama  cash-out experiment  confirmed  the  possibility,  which  had been
discussed  earlier (Fraker),  that  even  check benefits might have  a  greater effect  on food
spending than ordinary  income,  if recipients  are informed that the  check benefits  come
from the Food Stamp Program.  In San Diego, where  food stamp check benefits  and Aid
to Families  with  Dependent  Children were  combined  in  a  single  monthly check,  check
benefits were treated more like ordinary income.  The behavior of the Alabama recipients
is  consistent  with,  for  example,  Senauer  and  Young's  suggestion  that recipients  might
feel morally  obligated  to use food  stamp benefits  to  increase their food  spending.
Because  recipients  may  treat food  stamp  checks  differently  under different  cash-out
program designs,  the best estimates  of the effect  of replacing  food stamp  coupons  with
food stamp  checks must still come from actual  experiments.  By contrast,  adequate com-
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parisons  of food  stamp  coupons and  ordinary income  can be acquired using  less expen-
sive nonexperimental  models.  However,  these models must allow for the distinct effects
of food stamps  and  cash resources  on desired  food spending.
[Received April 1995; final version received March 1996.]
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